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Abstract 
 
Adoption of new technology by firms is very important for economic growth of a 
country. However, it may be insufficient or excessive in less competitive industries from 
the point of view of social welfare. Then, subsidization or taxation by the government is 
necessary. We present an analysis about subsidy or tax policy for adoption of new 
technology in an oligopoly with a homogeneous good. The unit cost with the new 
technology is lower than that with the present technology, but each firm must expend a 
fixed set-up cost to adopt and use the new technology. We will show that if the number 
of firms is small, and the set-up cost is large, subsidization to promote adoption of new 
technology may be the optimum policy. However, if the number of firms is not so small, 
or the set-up cost is not so large, taxation to prevent adoption of new technology is likely 
to be the optimum policy.   
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1. Introduction 
We consider the following story. There is an oligopolistic industry in a country. The 
firms in the industry produce a homogeneous good. The firms can use a common new 
production technology which is more efficient than the present technology. The 
production cost with the new technology is lower than that with the present technology, 
however each firm in the industry must expend some fixed set-up cost to adopt and use 
the new technology. Adoption of new technology by firms is very important for economic 
growth of a country. However, it may be insufficient or excessive in less competitive 
industries from the point of view of social welfare. Then, subsidization or taxation by the 
government is necessary.  
There are many references about technology adoption or R&D investment in duopoly 
or oligopoly. Examples are Katz and Shapiro (1985) , Kamien and Tauman (1986) , Sen 
and Tauman (2007), Kabiraj (2004), Wang and Yang (2004), Filippini (2005), La Manna 
(1993). Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato (2013) and Pal (2010). Concerning empirical 
studies H. Tanaka (2013, 2014) examined success factors of technology transfer from 
Japan to Taiwan (Republic of China) in post Word War 2 period. He stressed the 
importance of social capability which reduces the technology transfer cost such as human 
capacity of bureaucracy and managers, and the role of the government for improvement 
of infrastructure, education and training of workers and engineers. Also, he claims that 
government should choose the industry where foreign company can receive the tax 
benefit. And he concludes that these factors which promote technology transfer lead 
Taiwan to economic growth.  
We think that public policy for technology adoption, or international technology 
assistance has not been studied except for few works. In Hattori and Y. Tanaka (2014) 
adoption of new technology by firms in a Cournot duopoly with differentiated goods is 
analyzed. Also, Hattori and Y. Tanaka (2015) analyzed tax or subsidy policy for new 
technology adoption in a duopoly. This paper extends that analysis to a case of oligopoly.  
We analyze the optimum subsidization or taxation policies about adoption of new 
technology by firms in an oligopoly with a homogeneous good. We consider the 
following three-stage game.  
1. The first stage: The government determines the level of subsidies to (or 
taxes on) the firms.  
2. The second stage: The firms decide whether they adopt new technology or 
not.  
3. The third stage: The firms determine their outputs.  
The social welfare is defined to be consumers’ utility (evaluated by monetary measure) 
plus firms’ profits. Subsidies to the firms are financed by lump-sum taxes on consumers, 
and revenues from taxes on the firms are transferred to consumers in a lump-sum manner. 
These lump-sum taxes and transfers are not related to the good of this industry. Excluding 
income effect, they do not affect the demand for the good, and they are canceled out in 
the social welfare.  
We will show that if the number of firms is small, and the set-up cost is large, 
subsidization to promote adoption of new technology may be the optimum policy. In this 
case the increase in the social welfare (excluding set-up cost) due to adoption of new 
technology by a firm exceeds the increase in the profit of that firm (excluding set-up cost). 
However, if the number of firms is not so small, or the set-up cost is not so large, taxation 
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to prevent adoption of new technology is likely to be the optimum policy. In this case the 
increase in the profit of a firm due to adoption of new technology by that firm exceeds 
the increase in the social welfare.  
The reason why the optimum policy is likely to be taxation seems to be that the increase 
in the social welfare (excluding set-up cost) due to adoption of new technology is the 
difference between the social welfare when m  firms adopt new technology and the 
social welfare when 1m   firms adopt new technology; on the other hand, the increase 
in the profit of a firm (excluding set-up cost) due to adoption of new technology is the 
difference between the profit of an adopting firm when m  firms adopt new technology 
and the profit of a non-adopting firm when 1m   firms adopt new technology. Please 
see the examples in Subsection 5.4.  
In the next section we present the model of this paper, in Section 3 we analyze firm 
behavior, in Section 4 we consider the social welfare, and in Section 5 we examine the 
optimum policies.  
2. The model 
There are n  firms which produce a homogeneous good, and consider adoption of new 
technology. n  is an integer number which is not smaller than 2. The unit cost with the 
new technology is lower than the unit cost with the present technology, however, each 
firm must expend a fixed set-up cost to adopt and use the new technology.  
Suppose that the first m  firms adopt new technology, and the remaining n m  firms 
do not adopt. m  is an integer number such that 0 m n  . Call a firm which adopts 
new technology adopting firm and denote it by i . Call a firm which does not adopt non-
adopting firm and denote it by j .  
Denote the output of and the demand for the good of Firm i  (or j ) by ix  (or jx ), 
the price of the good by p . The utility function of consumers is  
 
2
1 1 1 1
1
2
m n m n
i j i j
i j m i j m
u a x x x x 
                       
          
where a  is a positive constant, and   is consumption of the numéraire good. We 
normalize the population of consumers as one. Let y  be a fixed income of consumers. 
The budget constraint for consumers is written as follows.  
 
1 1
m n
i j
i j m
y p x x
        
      
Then, the utility of consumers is rewritten as  
 
2
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
2
m n m n m n
i j i j i i
i j m i j m i j m
u a x x x x p x x y
                                      
              
The inverse demand function is derived as follows.  
 
1 1
m n
i j
i j m
p a x x
        
      
 
The cost function of Firm i  (or j ) before adoption of new technology is icx  (or jcx ), 
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and the production cost of each firm after adoption of new technology is zero. A fixed 
set-up cost is e . c  and e  are positive constants and common to all firms. There exists 
no fixed cost other than the set-up cost. We assume a nc  so that the output of each 
firm is positive.  
The total profit of firms is  
    
1 1
( ) ( )
m n
i i i j j j
i j m
px c x px c x S
  
       
( )i ic x  or ( )j jc x  generally denotes the cost function of Firm i  or j  which may 
include the set-up cost of new technology. S  is the total lump-sum subsidy to the firms. 
If 0S  , it is the total tax. Subsidies to the firms are financed by lump-sum taxes on 
consumers, and revenues from taxes on the firms are transferred to consumers in a lump-
sum manner. Let T  be the total lump-sum tax on consumers. If 0T  , it is the total 
lump-sum transfer to consumers. The social welfare is written as  
 
2
1 1 1 1 1 1
2
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 ( ) ( )2
1 ( ) ( )2
m n m n m n
i j i j i i i i
i j m i j m i j m
m n m n m n
i j i j i i j j
i j m i j m i j m
W a x x x x c x c x
S T y
a x x x x c x c x y
                          
                          
     
  
       
     
     
 
because S T . Hereafter we eliminate y  because it is fixed. The lump-sum taxes and 
transfers are not related to the good of this industry. Since the utility function of our model 
is quasi-linear, there is no income effect of consumers’ demand. Thus, lump-sum taxes 
and transfers do not affect the demand for the good. Also our analysis is a partial 
equilibrium analysis. 
If adoption of new technology and non-adoption are indifferent for a firm, then it adopts 
new technology. Similarly, if adoption of new technology and non-adoption are 
indifferent for the society, the government chooses adoption.  
3. Firm Behavior 
The profit of an adopting firm is written as  
 
1 1
m n
i k j i
k j m
a x x x e
        
       
and the profit of a non-adopting firm is  
 
1 1
m n
j i l j j
i l m
a x x x cx               
 
We assume Cournot type behavior of firms. In this section e  may include a lump-sum 
subsidy to or a lump-sum tax on each firm. The first order condition of profit 
maximization for an adopting firm is  
 
1 1
2 0
m n
i k j
k k i j m
a x x x
    
       
and the first order condition of profit maximization for a non-adopting firm is  
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1 1
2 0
m n
j i l
i l m l j
a x x x c
    
        
At the equilibrium the outputs of all adopting firms are equal, and the outputs of all non-
adopting firms are equal. Thus, these equations are rewritten as  
 ( 1) ( ) 0i ja m x n m x       
and  
 ( 1) 0i ja mx n m x c        
Denote the equilibrium outputs of Firm i  and j  when m  firms adopt new 
technology by mix  and mjx . Then,  
 ( )1
m
i
a n m cx
n
    
 
 ( 1)1
m
j
a m cx
n
    
Denote the equilibrium price of the good and the equilibrium profits of Firm i  and j  
by mp , mi  and mj . Then,  
 ( )1
m a n m cp
n
    
 
 
2( )
1
m
i
a n m c e
n
         
 
 
2( 1)
1
m
j
a m c
n
        
A superscript m  means that the number of new technology adopting firms is m .  
When 1m   firms adopt new technology, we have  
 
2
1
1
m
j
a mc
n
        
Let  
 1 2[2 ( 2 ) ]( ) ( 1)
m m
i j
nc a n m cm e
n
           
This is strictly decreasing with respect to m . We can see  
1. If ( )m e  , adoption of new technology by a non-adopting firm is 
beneficial when 1m   firms adopt.  
2. If ( )m e  , abandon of new technology by an adopting firm is beneficial 
and non-adoption is the best response for each non-adopting firm when m  firms 
adopt.  
3. If ( )m e  , adoption and non-adoption are indifferent for each firm.  
Let m  be an integer number such that  
 ( ) and ( 1)m e m e       
Then, since ( )m  is strictly decreasing in m , m  is the equilibrium number of new 
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technology adopting firms, that is, at the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game after 
the second stage m  firms adopt new technology. m  is decreasing with respect to e .  
If ( )e n  , the equilibrium number of adopting firms is n , and if (1) e  , the 
equilibrium number of adopting firms is 0 .  
4. Social welfare 
Denote the total output of the good when m  firms adopt new technology by mX . Then,  
 ( )1
m na n m cX
n
    
The social welfare when m  firms adopt new technology is denoted as  
 2 21 ( ) ( )2 2( 1)
m m m m
j
AW aX X n m cx me me
n
         
where  
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2
3 2 4
A c mn c n acn a n c m n c mn acmn c n acn a n
c m c m acm
         
     
Let  
 
2
1
2
(4 2 4 4 2 6 )( ) 2( 1)
m m a cn cmn cn an cm c cm W e W
n
             
This is strictly decreasing with respect to m . We can see  
1. If ( )m e  , adoption of new technology by a non-adopting firm 
improves the social welfare when 1m   firms adopt.  
2. If ( )m e  , abandon of new technology by an adopting firm improves 
the social welfare when m  firms adopt.  
3. If ( )m e  , they are indifferent.  
Let m  be an integer number such that  
 ( ) and ( 1)m e m e       
Since ( )m  is strictly decreasing in m , m  is the optimum number of new 
technology adopting firms for the society, that is, when m  firms adopt new technology 
the social welfare is maximized. m  is decreasing with respect to e .  
If ( )e n  , the optimum number of adopting firms is n , and if (1) e  , the 
optimum number of adopting firms is 0 .  
5. Subsidies or taxes 
5.1. The optimum policies 
In this section we consider a subsidy or tax policy by the government for new technology 
adoption in an oligopoly. Here e  denotes only the set-up cost. It does not include a 
lump-sum subsidy nor tax.  
There are three cases.  
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1. If m m   , the government should give subsidies to the firms for new technology 
adoption. In this case the government should give chances to receive subsidies to all firms. 
Let s  be the level of the subsidy. Then,  
 ( 1) ( )m e s m        
must be satisfied. The level of the subsidy to each firm must not be smaller than 
( )e m  and must be smaller than ( 1)e m  .  
In actuality m  firms receive the subsidies and adopt new technology.  
 
2. If m m   , the government should impose taxes on the firms so as to decrease the 
number of new technology adopting firms. In this case the government should impose 
taxes on all firms. Let t  be the level of the tax. Then,  
 ( 1) ( )m e t m        
must be satisfied. The level of the tax on each firm must not be larger than ( )m e   
and must be larger than ( 1)m e   .  
In actuality m  firms pay the taxes and adopt new technology.  
 
3. If m m   , the government should do nothing.  
5.2. Condition for subsidization to be the optimum policy 
Comparing ( )m  and ( )m  yields  
 2(2 4 6 4 )( ) ( ) 2( 1)
an a cm c cn cm m
n
        (1) 
If 2n   and 2a c , this is increasing in m  and a , and increasing in n  when n  
is not so large. It represents the difference between the increase in the profit of a firm 
(excluding set-up cost) when it adopts new technology and the increase in the social 
welfare (excluding set-up cost) by that adoption. (1) implies that if a  and n  are small, 
and e  is large (because the equilibrium value of m  is small when e  is large), 
( ) ( )m m   may be negative. If it is negative, the increase in the social welfare due to 
adoption of new technology by a firm exceeds the increase in the profit of that firm, and 
then subsidization is the optimum policy.  
Since ( ) ( )m m   is increasing in m , we need (1) (1) 0    for subsidization 
to be the optimum policy. Solving (1) (1)   , we get 4 52( 2 )a ca cn  . Since a nc , n  
must not be larger than 3. Thus, the optimum policy is never subsidization when the 
number of firms is larger than 3. Also, the set-up cost need to be large for subsidization 
to be the optimum policy. Summarizing the results,  
Proposition 1.  
1. The optimum policy may be subsidization if the number firms in the 
industry is small, and the set-up cost is large.  
2. The optimum policy is taxation or to do nothing if the number firms in the 
industry is not so small or the set-up cost is not so large.  
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5.3. Discussion about the effects of the number of firms 
As shown in Hattori and Y. Tanaka (2015) and the examples in the next section when 
the number of firms is small (two or three), subsidization may be the optimum policy, but 
when the number of firms is large, subsidization cannot be optimum. Let us consider the 
reason.  
As we pointed out just before Proposition 1 subsidization can be optimum only if 
(1) (1) 0   . We have  
2
2 2
[2 ( 2 ) ] (4 2 4 4 2 6 )( ) , ( ) ,( 1) 2( 1)
nc a n m c a cn cmn cn an cm c cm m
n n
             
and ( ) ( )m m   is expressed in (1). ( )m  is the difference between the profit of 
each adopting firm when m  firms adopt the new technology and the profit of each 
non-adopting firm when 1m   firms adopt. ( )m  is the difference between the 
social welfare when m firms adopt new technology and the social welfare when 1m 
firms adopt. Denote the numerators of ( )m  and ( )m , respective, by   and  . 
Denominators of ( )m  and ( )m  are equal. Now compare the derivatives of   
and   with respect to n . Then, for any value of m  
 ( 2 ) 0a c c
n n
         
Thus, as the number of firms n increases, the numerator of ( )m  more rapidly 
increases than the numerator of ( )m . It is the reason why the larger the number of 
firms in oligopoly, the more likely taxation is optimum. 
5.4. Examples 
We consider the following four cases to illustrate the results of this paper.  
1. Assume 12a  , 2c  , 5n  . The values of ( )m  and ( )m  are 
shown in Table 1. W e  in the following tables represents the social welfare 
excluding the set-up cost.  
 
m ( )m ( )m W e m
i e   mj  
0   48.61  2.8 
1 8.3  7.17 55.78 11.1 1.78 
2 7.22 5.7 61.5 9 1  
3 6.1 4.3 65.8 7.1 0.4 
4 5 2.8 68.6 5.4 0.1 
5 3.9 1.4 70 4  
 
 Table 1. 12a  , 2c  , 5n   
The optimum policies are as follows.  
When 8 3e   , 0 0m m   , the optimum policy is to do nothing.  
When 7 22 8 3e    , 1 0m m   , the optimum policy is taxation.  
When 7 17 7 22e    , 2 0m m   , the optimum policy is taxation.  
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When 6 1 7 17e    , 2 1m m   , the optimum policy is taxation.  
When 5 7 6 1e    , 3 1m m   , the optimum policy is taxation.  
When 5 5 7e   , 3 2m m   , the optimum policy is taxation.  
When 4 3 5e   , 4 2m m   , the optimum policy is taxation.  
When 3 9 4 3e    , 4 3m m   , the optimum policy is taxation.  
When 2 8 3 9e    , 5 3m m   , the optimum policy is taxation.  
When 1 4 2 8e    , 5 4m m   , the optimum policy is taxation.  
When 1 4e   , 5 5m m   , the optimum policy is to do nothing.  
 
2. Assume 6 9a   , 2c  , 3n  . The values of ( )m  and ( )m  are shown in 
Table 2.  
 
m ( )m ( )m W e m
i e   mj  
0   11.25  1.5 
1 5.93 5.94 17.19 7.43 0.53 
2 4.4 3.7 20.9 4.95 0.1 
3 2.9 1.4 22.3 3.0  
 
 Table 2. 6 9a   , 2c  , 3n   
The optimum policies are as follows.  
When 5 94e   , 0 0m m   , the optimum policy is to do nothing.  
When 5 93 5 94e    , 0 1m m   , the optimum policy is subsidization.  
When 4 4 5 93e    , 1 1m m   , the optimum policy is to do nothing.  
When 3 7 4 4e    , 2 1m m   , the optimum policy is taxation.  
When 2 9 3 7e    , 2 2m m   , the optimum policy is to do nothing.  
When 1 4 2 9e    , 3 2m m   , the optimum policy is taxation.  
When 1 4e   , 3 3m m   , the optimum policy is to do nothing.  
3. Assume 5a  , 2c  , 2n  . The values of ( )m  and ( )m  are shown in 
Table 3.  
 
m ( )m ( )m W e m
i e   mj
0   4  1 
1 4.4 5.1 9.1 5.4 0.1 
2 2.7 2 11.1 2.8  
 
 Table 3. 5a  , 2c  , 2n   
The optimum policies are as follows.  
When 5 1e   , 0 0m m   , the optimum policy is to do nothing.  
When 4 4 5 1e    , 0 1m m   , the optimum policy is subsidization.  
- 10 - 
 
When 2 7 4 4e    , 1 1m m   , the optimum policy is to do nothing.  
When 2 2 7e   , 2 1m m   , the optimum policy is taxation.  
When 2e  , 2 2m m   , the optimum policy is to do nothing.  
4. Assume 17a  , 2c  , 8n  . The values of ( )m  and ( )m  are shown in 
Table 4.  
 
m ( )m ( )m W e  m
i e   mj  
0   111.11 2.77 
1 9.08 7.23 118.34 11.86 2.08 
2 8.29 6.29 124.64 10.38 1.49 
3 7.50 5.35 130  9  1  
4 6.71 4.41 134.41 7.71  0.6 
5 5.92 3.48 137.90 6.53  0.3 
6 5.13 2.54 140.44 5.44  0.11 
7 4.34 1.6  142.04 4.45  0.01 
8 3.55 0.66 142.71 3.56   
 
 Table 4. 17a  , 2c  , 8n   
The optimum policy is to do nothing if 9 08e    or 0 66e   . In all other cases the 
optimum policy is taxation.  
The optimum policy is subsidization in only two cases. These examples suggest that if 
the number of firms in the industry is not so small or the set-up cost is not so large, the 
optimum policy is unlikely subsidization.  
6. Concluding Remark 
In this paper we have analyzed the optimum policy for new technology adoption in an 
oligopoly using a simple model with a homogeneous good. The type of optimum policies, 
subsidization or taxation or do-nothing, depends on the level of the set-up cost and the 
number of firms in the oligopoly. We have shown that taxation is more likely the optimum 
policy than subsidization. Subsidization may be the optimum policy only when the 
number of firms is small, and the set-up cost is large.  
The reason why the optimum policy is likely to be taxation seems to be that the value of 
( )m  is the difference between the social welfare when m  firms adopt new 
technology and the social welfare when 1m   firms adopt new technology; on the other 
hand, ( )m  is the difference between the profit of an adopting firm when m  firms 
adopt new technology and the profit of a non-adopting firm when 1m   firms adopt new 
technology.  
We want to generalize the analyses in this paper to a case of heterogenous goods and a 
case of general demand and cost functions.  
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